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ABSTRACT
With the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI), ethical
issues surrounding AI have attracted increasing attention. In par-
ticular, autonomous vehicles may face moral dilemmas in accident
scenarios, such as staying the course resulting in hurting pedes-
trians or swerving leading to hurting passengers. To investigate
such ethical dilemmas, recent studies have adopted preference
aggregation, in which each voter expresses her/his preferences
over decisions for the possible ethical dilemma scenarios, and
a centralized system aggregates these preferences to obtain the
winning decision. Although a useful methodology for building
ethical AI systems, such an approach can potentially violate the
privacy of voters since moral preferences are sensitive informa-
tion and their disclosure can be exploited by malicious parties
resulting in negative consequences. In this paper, we report a first-
of-its-kind privacy-preserving crowd-guided AI decision-making
approach in ethical dilemmas. We adopt the formal and popular
notion of differential privacy to quantify privacy, and consider
four granularities of privacy protection by taking voter-/record-
level privacy protection and centralized/distributed perturbation
into account, resulting in four approaches VLCP, RLCP, VLDP,
and RLDP, respectively. Moreover, we propose different algorithms
to achieve these privacy protection granularities, while retaining
the accuracy of the learned moral preference model. Specifically,
VLCP and RLCP are implemented with the data aggregator setting
a universal privacy parameter and perturbing the averaged moral
preference to protect the privacy of voters’ data. VLDP and RLDP
are implemented in such a way that each voter perturbs her/his
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local moral preference with a personalized privacy parameter.
Extensive experiments based on both synthetic data and real-world
data of voters’ moral decisions demonstrate that the proposed
approach can achieve high accuracy of preference aggregation
while protecting individual voter’s privacy.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Data anonymization and saniti-
zation; Privacy protections; Human and societal aspects of
security and privacy.
KEYWORDS
Artificial intelligence, ethical decision making, differential privacy.
1 INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming an integral part of our daily
lives and critical infrastructures. With the widespread applications
of AI, ethical issues surrounding AI have become an important
socio-technical challenge [3, 27]. One of the fundamental questions
in AI ethics is how to allow humans to guide AI to make moral
decisions when faced with ethical dilemmas. An ethical dilemma
is a situation in which any decision violates certain aspects of
ethics [29]. The following is a concrete example of an ethical
dilemma that autonomous vehicles encounter [16]. A self-driving
car has a suddenmechanical failure and cannot brake in time. If the
car were to continue its current trajectory, it would kill pedestrians
but the passenger would be safe. Alternatively, if it were to swerve
into a wall, the pedestrians would be safe but the passenger would
be killed. In such a situation, an ethical dilemma arises when the AI
must choose between the two alternatives. This is just one example
of many ethical dilemmas AI technologies face [23]. To enable AI
to deal with such situations, it is useful to aggregate opinions from
the human society.
To explore moral dilemmas faced by autonomous vehicles, Bon-
nefon et al. [4] surveyed via Amazon Mechanical Turk whether
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people prefer to savemany versus few lives, or the vehicle’s passen-
gers versus pedestrians. Their findings suggest that participants
prefer others to buy autonomous vehicles which sacrifice their
passengers for the greater good, but prefer for themselves to ride
in autonomous vehicles which protect passengers at all costs.
In a study similar to [4], Awad et al. [3] also gathered data
about voters’ decisions in scenarios where autonomous vehicles
face ethical dilemmas, but at a much larger scale and with each
voter’s data containing more dimensions. Specifically, they built an
online experimental platform named the Moral Machine1 , which
collected 39.61 million decisions in ten languages from 4 million
people in 233 countries and territories. The data collected from
each voter are high-dimensional, which include preferences of
saving many versus few lives, passengers versus pedestrians, the
young versus the elderly, humans versus pets, and pedestrianswho
cross legally versus pedestrianswho jaywalk, etc.With such a high
volume of crowdsourced data, Awad et al. [3] summarized global
and regional moral preferences as well as cross-cultural ethical
variations.
Using the data collected from theMoralMachine, Noothigattu et al.
[21] built a global moral preference model so as to guide auto-
mated ethical decision-making. Specifically, each voter’s data are
analyzed to infer her/his parameter of moral preference, and the
moral preference of the society is obtained by averaging voters’
parameters. Each voter’s data consist of a number of records, with
each record being the voter’s preference in a given ethical dilemma
scenario. In each scenario, no matter how the autonomous vehicle
decides to act, some undesirable outcome will happen. A voter’s
preference in each scenario means that the voter prefers a decision
made by the autonomous vehicle (e.g., staying the course and
killing the crossing pedestrians) over the other alternative (e.g.,
swerving and killing the passengers).
As discussed above, existing studies on AI ethics (e.g., [3, 4,
21]) directly analyze voters’ data of moral decisions. However,
such approaches may violate the privacy of voters. Since moral
preferences are sensitive information and their disclosure may be
exploited by malicious parties to produce negative consequences.
One may wonder how the learned and aggregated moral prefer-
ence model for the society can leak a voter’s sensitive choices
about the moral dilemmas. A recent work [14] has shown that
an adversary can successfully use a learned deep neural network
model to infer users’ sensitive facial information in the training
dataset. Specifically, for an attacker which obtains the learned face
recognition model, although it is difficult to infer all users’ faces,
the attacker may recover an image which is close to one user’s face,
resulting in a privacy breach of the particular user in the training
dataset [14].
In this paper, to prevent the learned preference model of the
society from leaking individual voter’s sensitive information, we
propose a differential privacy (DP)-based secure preference ag-
gregation model to enable crowdsourced opinions to guide AI
decision-making in ethical dilemmas without exposing sensitive
privacy information. We adopt the formal notion of DP [10, 12]
to quantify privacy. Intuitively, by incorporating some noise, the
output of an algorithm under DP will not change significantly
1http://moralmachine.mit.edu/
due to the presence or absence of one voter’s information in the
dataset.
Contributions. With the proposed approach, we make the
following contributions in this paper.
• We quantify four granularities of privacy protection by comb-
ing voter-/record-level privacy protection and centralized/distributed
perturbation, which are denoted by VLCP, RLCP, VLDP, and
RLDP.We further propose different algorithms to achieve them.
Specifically, to achieve VLCP and RLCP, the aggregator adds
Laplace noise to the average preference parameter of all voters.
VLDP and RLDP are achieved by having each voter adding
Laplace noise to her/his local moral preference parameter with
a personalized privacy parameter. Moreover, we also propose
to achieve RLDP by perturbing the objective function when
learning each voter’s preference parameters, which achieves
higher accuracy than the addition of Laplace noise.
• We conduct extensive experiments on both synthetic datasets
and a real-world dataset extracted from the Moral Machine.
The results demonstrate that our algorithms can achieve high
accuracy while ensuring strong privacy protection.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research on privacy
issues in studies of human-guided ethical AI decision-making.
More specifically, we proposed privacy-preserving mechanisms to
address voters’ privacy in computing a society’s moral preference.
Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 reviews the related studies of AI ethics and
privacy protection. In Section 3, we discuss the preliminaries of
differential privacy and formalize the research problem. Section 4
presents the proposed privacy-preserving crowd-guided ethical AI
decision-making algorithms. In Section 5, we conduct extensive ex-
periments to evaluate the effectiveness of our algorithms. Section 6
provides discussions and future directions. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 RELATED WORK
The widespread adoption of AI has made it pertinent to address
the ethical issues surrounding this technology.
Greene et al. [15] advocated solving AI ethical issues via pref-
erence aggregation, in which each voter expresses her/his prefer-
ences over the possible decisions, and a centralized system aggre-
gates these preferences to obtain thewinning decision. Conitzer et al. [7]
discussed the idea of collecting a labeled dataset ofmoral dilemmas
represented as lists of feature values, and then leveraging machine
learning techniques to learn to classify actions as morally right
or wrong. However, no actual data collection or analysis was
presented. Using a large-scale dataset of voters’ ethical decisions
collected by the Moral Machine [3], Noothigattu et al. [21] built a
moral preference model for each voter and averaged these models
to obtain the moral preference of the whole society. Hammond and
Belle [17] utilized tractable probabilistic learning to induce mod-
els of moral scenarios and blameworthiness automatically from
datasets of human decision-making, and computed judgments
tractably from the obtained models. Zhang and Conitzer [30]
showed that many classical results from Probably Approximately
Correct (PAC) learning can be applied to the preference aggrega-
tion framework. For a comprehensive study of more related work
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on AI ethics, interested readers can refer to a recent survey by
Yu et al. [29].
The above studies significantly contributed to the emerging
area of AI ethics, but unfortunately, none of them is designed to
protect voters’ privacy in the data analysis process. Moral prefer-
ences of voters are sensitive information and should be protected
using privacy-enhancing technologies, since their disclosure can
be exploited by malicious entities to have adverse consequences.
A recent work [14] has shown that even a learned deep neural
network can leak sensitive information in the training dataset.
Hence, it is critical to incorporate formal privacy protection into
models for AI ethics guided by humans.
To quantify privacy, we use the rigorous notion of differential
privacy (DP) [12]. Recently, differential privacy has been widely
studied in many areas [1]. For general statistical data release prob-
lems, DP can be achieved by the Laplace mechanism [11] which in-
jects Laplace noise into the released statistical results. Furthermore,
for parameter estimation solved by an optimization problem, an
alternative algorithm to achieve DP is the functional mechanism
proposed by [31], which perturbs the objective function of the
optimization problem rather than the optimized parameters.
As a representative example, in this paper, we add voter privacy
protection into the learned moral preference model of Nooth-
igattu et al. [21]. Incorporating privacy protection into other stud-
ies are future directions. Although Jones et al. [18] and Brubaker
[5] emphasized the importance of security and privacy protection
in AI ethics, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first
technical work to formally build privacy protection into the study
of AI ethics.
3 PRELIMINARIES
Differential privacy (DP) [12] provides strong guarantees for the
privacy of any individual in a query response, regardless of the
adversary’s prior knowledge. Therefore, based on DP, we consider
protecting the privacy of each participating voter while they
are involved in guiding ethical decision-making by AI. Formally,
differential privacy is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (ϵ-Differential Privacy (DP) [10, 12]). A
randomized algorithm Y satisfies ϵ-differential privacy, if for any
two neighboring datasets D and D′ which differ in only one tuple,
and for any possible subset of outputsY of Y , we have
P [Y (D) ∈ Y] ≤ eϵ × P [Y (D′) ∈ Y] , (1)
where P [·] is the probability of an event. ϵ refers to the privacy
parameter. Smaller ϵ means stronger privacy protection, but less
utility as more randomness is introduced into Y .
There are two variants of DP: bounded DP and unbounded
DP [26]. In bounded DP, which we adopt in this paper, two
neighboring datasets have the same sizes but different records
at only one of all positions. In unbounded DP, the sizes of two
neighboring datasets differ by one (i.e. one tuple is in one database,
but not in the other).
The Laplace Mechanism [11] can be used to achieve DP by
adding independent Laplace noise to each dimension of the query
output. The scale λ of the zero-mean Laplace noise Lap(λ) is set as
λ = ∆/ϵ , where ∆ is the ℓ1-norm sensitivity of the query function
Q , whichmeasures themaximumchange of the outputs over neigh-
boring datasets (i.e. ∆ = maxneighboring datasets D, D′ ‖Q(D) −Q(D′)‖1).
Note that the notion of neighboring datasets in DP can be defined
using any distance metric [6]. In Section 4.1, we will introduce two
variants for the meaning of neighboring datasets.
Problem Formulation. In our system model, each voter i ∈
{1, 2, · · · ,N } owns a dataset of n pairwise comparisons (i.e., n
records), denoted byDi = {〈X (i )1 ,Z
(i )
1 〉, 〈X
(i )
2 ,Z
(i )
2 〉, · · · , 〈X
(i )
n ,Z
(i )
n 〉 }.
X
(i )
j and Z
(i )
j are pairwise alternatives capturing moral dilemmas
in a scenario (e.g.,X (i )j means staying the course resulting in killing
crossing pedestrians, while Z (i )j means swerving leading to killing
passengers). Any pair 〈X (i )j ,Z
(i )
j 〉 for j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,n} means that
voter i chose X (i )j over Z
(i )
j . Each X
(i )
j or Z
(i )
j is a d-dimensional
vector such that X (i )j [k] and Z
(i )
j [k] for k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,d} denote
the k-th dimensional value of X (i )j and Z
(i )
j , respectively. The
dimension of a scenario represents its features (e.g., the number
of young passengers, the number of old pedestrians, the number
of pets, etc).
Noothigattu et al. [21] adopted the Thurstone–Mosteller pro-
cess [20], which models the utility as a Gaussian random variable.
Let βi ∈ Rd be the preference parameter of voter i , where
R denotes the set of real numbers. It is assumed [20] that the
utilities of alternatives X (i )j and Z
(i )
j follow Gaussian distributions
N(β⊤i X
(i )
j ,
1
2 ) and N(β⊤i Z
(i )
j ,
1
2 ), respectively. Thus, the result of
the utility by choosing X (i )j minus the utility by choosing Z
(i )
j
follows a Gaussian distributionN(β⊤i (X
(i )
j − Z
(i )
j ), 1), so that
P
[
a voter i chooses X (i )j over Z
(i )
j
]
= Φ(β⊤i (X
(i )
j − Z
(i )
j )), where
Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution (i.e. Φ(s) := 12 + 1√π
∫ s√
2
0 e
−t 2 dt ). Then, the maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) method is used to learn the parameter
βi for each voter i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,N }. In particular, the log-likelihood
function is defined as follows:
L(βi ,Di ) :=
n∑
j=1
lnΦ(β⊤i (X (i )j − Z
(i )
j )). (2)
Based on Eq. (2), Noothigattu et al. [21] use MLE to estimate the
βi of each voter. However, the optimal parameter βi to maximize
Eq. (2) may not always exist. For example, given i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,N },
if X (i )j − Z
(i )
j is positive for each j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,n}, suppose there
exists βi to maximize Eq. (2), then each dimension of βi is positive.
However, a contraction occurs with L(2βi ,Di ) > L(βi ,Di ).
Hence, in the case of positiveX (i )j −Z
(i )
j for all j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,n}, no
βi exists to maximize Eq. (2). In order to ensure that (i) the optimal
parameter can always be found, and (ii) bounded sensitivity that
will be used in the Laplace mechanism for achieving differential
privacy, we introduce a constraint that each voter’s parameter has
an ℓ1-norm at most B. Specifically, we define user i’s parameter
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βi (Di ) by
βi (Di ) := argmax
βi : ‖βi ‖1≤B
L(βi ,Di ). (3)
After learning the parameters βi (Di ) for all voters, the prefer-
ence parameter β(D) for the whole society is computed by averag-
ing all voters’ preference parameters (i.e. β(D) := 1N
∑N
i=1 βi (Di ),
for D := {D1,D2, · · · ,DN } denoting the whole dataset of N
voters). Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to design privacy-
preserving algorithms to guarantee voter privacy while learning a
society’s preference parameter with high accuracy.
4 OUR SOLUTIONS
In this section, we first introduce the privacy model, where we
discuss four privacy protection paradigms. Then, our algorithms
to achieve these paradigms are presented.
4.1 Privacy Modeling
Our paper incorporates privacy protection into preference aggre-
gation of Noothigattu et al. [21]. In this setting, each voter’s data
consist of a number of records, with each record being the voter’s
preference in a given scenario. In each scenario, no matter how
the autonomous vehicle decides to act, someone will get hurt. A
voter’s preference in each scenario means that the voter prefers a
decision made by the autonomous vehicle (e.g., staying the course
and killing crossing pedestrians) over the other alternative (e.g.,
swerving and killing passengers).
Based on the above observations, in our study of privacy protec-
tion for crowdsourced data collection in AI ethics, we will consider
two variants for the meaning of neighboring datasets: 1) record-
neighboring and 2) voter-neighboring datasets, which allow us
to achieve voter-level privacy protection and record-level privacy
protection, respectively:
• Voter-level privacy protection.Two datasets are voter-neighboring
datasets if one can be obtained from the other by changing one
voter’s records arbitrarily.
• Record-level privacy protection. Two datasets are record-
neighboring if one can be obtained from the other by changing
a single record of one voter.
For completeness, we also consider the case of a trusted aggre-
gator and the case of an untrusted aggregator, where privacy is
achieved with centralized perturbation and distributed perturbation,
respectively:
• Centralizedperturbation.When the aggregator is trusted by
the voters, the aggregator perturbs the aggregated information
(e.g., by adding noise) in a centralized manner to protect
privacy. We refer to this as centralized perturbation.
• Distributedperturbation.When the aggregator is not trusted
by the voters, each voter independently perturbs her/his local
data (e.g., by adding noise) in a distributed manner for privacy
protection. We refer to this as distributed perturbation.
Permutating centralized/distributed perturbation and voter-level/
record-level privacy protection yields four alternative privacy pro-
tection paradigms: (1) voter-level privacy protectionwith centralized
perturbation (VLCP); (2) record-level privacy protectionwith centralized
perturbation (RLCP); (3) voter-level privacy protectionwith distributed
perturbation (VLDP); (4) record-level privacy protectionwith distributed
perturbation (RLDP).
(1) VLCP: For ϵ-differential privacy with VLCP, the aggregator
chooses a universal privacy parameter ϵ and enforces a ran-
domization algorithmY such that for any two voter-neighboring
datasets D and D′, and for any possible subset of outputsY of
Y , we have P [Y (D) ∈ Y] ≤ eϵ × P [Y (D′) ∈ Y].
(2) RLCP: For ϵ-differential privacy with RLCP, the aggregator
chooses a universal privacy parameter ϵ and enforces a ran-
domization algorithmY such that for any two record-neighboring
datasets D and D′, and for any possible subset of outputsY of
Y , we have P [Y (D) ∈ Y] ≤ eϵ × P [Y (D′) ∈ Y].
(3) VLDP: For ϵi -differential privacy with VLDP, voter i chooses a
privacy parameter ϵi and enforces a randomization algorithm
Yi such that for any two datasetsDi andD′i (which are naturally
voter-neighboring), and for any possible subset of outputs Yi
ofYi , we have P [Yi (Di ) ∈ Yi ] ≤ eϵi ×P
[
Yi (D′i ) ∈ Yi
]
. We note
that VLDP is the same as the notion of ϵ-local differential pri-
vacy [8] which has recently received much interest [13, 25, 28].
(4) RLDP: For ϵi -differential privacy with VLDP, voter i chooses a
privacy parameter ϵi and enforces a randomization algorithm
Yi such that for any two record-neighboring datasets Di and
D′i , and for any possible subset of outputs Yi of Yi , we have
P [Yi (Di ) ∈ Yi ] ≤ eϵi × P
[
Yi (D′i ) ∈ Yi
]
.
In what follows, we further disambiguate the above four privacy
protection paradigms, and outline how each of them can be real-
ized.
First, VLCP can be achieved with the data aggregator setting a
universal privacy parameter ϵ and perturbing the averaged moral
preference by adding Laplace noise to protect the privacy of each
voter’s complete data. Second, RLCP can be achieved in the same
way as VLCP when using Laplace mechanism. This is because the
ℓ1 sensitivity of the averaged parameter under RLCP is the same
as that under VLCP, which will be proved in Theorem 1. Third,
VLDP is a strong privacy protection paradigm and can be achieved
by perturbing each voter’s moral preference by adding Laplace
noise to protect each record in the dataset. Each voter i can choose
a personalized privacy parameter ϵi to perturb her/his moral
preference accordingly, and report the noisy moral preference to
the aggregator. Finally, RLDP can be achieved by the same way as
VLDP when using Laplace mechanism. The reason is that the ℓ1
sensitivity of each voter’s parameter under RLDP is the same as
that under VLDP, which will be proved in Theorem 3.
However, achieving RLDP by adding Laplace noise directly
leads to limited utility even for weak privacy protection, as il-
lustrated in our experiments in Section 5. Therefore, to pursuing
better utility, we propose to adopt the functional mechanism
[31], which enforces differential privacy by perturbing the object
function of the optimization problem, rather than the optimized
parameters (i.e., each voter’s moral preference). Note that we can’t
adopt the functional mechanism to estimate the social preference
parameter under voter-level privacy protection or centralized per-
turbation. This is because the social preference parameter is de-
rived by averaging the preference parameters of all voters instead
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of the solution of the optimization problem. The functional mech-
anism itself is used for analyzing and solving the optimization
problem.
Therefore, this paper will consider the above four privacy pro-
tection paradigms to achieve differential privacy protection for
ethical decision making of AI and will propose three algorithms
which cover the above four paradigms. Specifically, the three
algorithms are outlined as follows.
• VLCP/RLCP algorithm via perturbing the average moral pref-
erence parameters of all voters by Laplace mechanism.
• VLDP/RLDP algorithm via perturbing the moral preference
parameters of each voter by Laplace mechanism.
• RLDP algorithm via perturbing the object function of each
voter.
In the following subsections, we will introduce the proposed
algorithms in detail.
4.2 VLCP/RLCP: Perturbing the Average Moral
Preference Parameters
In this section, we propose an algorithm to achieve VLCP and
RLCP by perturbing the average moral preference parameters esti-
mated from maximum likelihood estimation. Each voter i obtains
its parameter βi (Di ) according to Eq. (3), which enforces the ℓ1-
norm of βi (Di ) to be at most B. Then each voter i sends it to
the aggregator, and the aggregator computes the average estimate
β(D) := 1N
∑N
i=1 βi (Di ), for D := {D1,D2, · · · ,DN }. The ℓ1-
sensitivity of β with respect to neighboring datasets equals 2B/N ,
since the maximal range that βi (Di ) can change is no greater than
2B by the triangle inequality (see Theorem 1 for specific proofs).
As shown in Algorithm 1, after computing the average parameters
of all voters, a random noise vector R will be drawn from the
Laplace distribution [Lap( 2BNϵ )]d . Then, the perturbed preference
parameter β∗(D) = β(D) + R is returned as the final social moral
preference parameter. Note that we may suppress the argumentDi
in βi (Di ) and the argument D in β(D), β∗(D) for simplicity.
Algorithm 1: VLCP/RLCP: Perturbing the Average Moral Prefer-
ence Parameters by Adding Laplace Noise
Input: voters pairwise comparison data D = {D1, D2, · · · , DN },
universal privacy parameter ϵ , norm bound B
Output: noisy parameter β∗
1 for each voter i with data Di = { 〈X (i)1 , Z
(i)
1 〉, · · · , 〈X
(i)
n , Z
(i)
n 〉 } do
2 Apply MLE to estimate β i of voter i with log-likelihood function
L(βi ) =
∑n
j=1 lnΦ(β⊤i (X
(i)
j − Z
(i)
j )), subject to ‖β i ‖1 ≤ B;
3 voter i sends β i to the aggregator;
4 The aggregator computes the average estimate: β = 1N
∑N
i=1 β i ;
5 The aggregator draws a random Laplace noise vector
R ∼ [Lap( 2BNϵ )]d ;
6 Return β∗ = β + R ;
Theorem 1 (Privacy of Algorithm 1). Algorithm 1 satisfies ϵ-
differential privacy for both VLCP and RLCP.
Proof. First, we prove that the sensitivities ∆VLCP and ∆RLCP
with respect to voter-neighboring datasets and record-neighboring
datasets are both 2B/N under centralized perturbation, where
∆VLCP := max
D and D′ differing in a single voter’s records
‖β (D) − β (D′)‖1, (4)
∆RLCP := max
D and D′ differing in a single voter’s one record
‖β (D) − β (D′)‖1 . (5)
LetD = {D1, · · · ,Di , · · · ,DN } andD′ = {D1, · · · ,D′i , · · · ,DN }
be record-neighboring datasets such that D and D′ differ in only
a single voter i’s one record, i.e., Di and D′i . We assume Di :=
{〈X (i )1 ,Z
(i )
1 〉, 〈X
(i )
2 ,Z
(i )
2 〉, · · · , 〈X
(i )
n ,Z
(i )
n 〉 }, where each dimension
ofX (i )1 −Z
(i )
1 is 1, and each dimension ofX
(i )
j −Z
(i )
j for j ∈ {2, . . . ,n}
is close to 0, and D′i := {〈X
(i )
1
′
,Z
(i )
1
′〉, 〈X (i )2 ,Z
(i )
2 〉, · · · , 〈X
(i )
n ,Z
(i )
n 〉
}, where each dimension of X (i )1 − Z
(i )
1 is −1, and each dimension
of X (i )j − Z
(i )
j for j ∈ {2, . . . ,n} is close to 0. Therefore, based on
Eq. (3), we know that each of thed dimensions of βi (Di ) and βi (D′i )
are close to B
d
and − B
d
, respectively. Given β(D) := 1N
∑N
i=1 βi (Di )
and β(D′) := 1N βi (D′i )+ 1N
∑
j∈{1,2, ...,N }\{i } β j (Dj ), the ℓ1-norm
difference between β(D) and β(D′) equals 1N βi (Di ) − 1N βi (D′i ),
which can be made to be arbitrarily close to 2BN . Hence, the ℓ1-
norm sensitivity of β with respect to record-neighboring datasets
is 2BN .
In a way similar to the above argument, the ℓ1-norm sensi-
tivity of β with respect to voter-neighboring datasets is 2BN . For
voter-neighboring datasets D = {D1, · · · ,Di , · · · ,DN } and D′ =
{D1, · · · ,D′i , · · · ,DN }, voter i’s dataset variants Di and D′i can
differ arbitrarily.
Thus, we obtain ∆RLCP = ∆VLCP = 2B/N . Recall that
Algorithm 1 considers the centralized perturbation paradigm and
adds noises drawn from [Lap( 2BNϵ )]d to the average parameters of
all voters. From Laplace mechanism [11], it can be proved that
Algorithm 1 satisfies ϵ-differential privacy for both VLCP and
RLCP. 
We now analyze the utility of Algorithm 1. At the end of
Algorithm 1, the aggregator obtains the parameter vector of moral
preference β∗, which can be understood as a noisy version of the
true result β . We consider the utility of Algorithm 1 by analyzing
the probability that thep-norm of the estimation error β∗−β is no
greater than a given quantity α . To this end, we note that β∗ − β
follows a d-dimensional multivariate Laplace distribution, with
each dimension being an independent zero-mean Laplace random
variable with scale 2BNϵ . With h(µ) denoting the probability density
function of random variable β∗−β being a given µ, the expression
of h(µ) involves Bessel function. Hence, for general p-norm, it
is difficult to compute P
[β∗ − β
p
≤ α
]
=
∫
µ : ‖µ ‖p ≤α h(µ)dµ.
Below we consider the special case of ∞-norm following [12],
where we use the union bound to present the utility result of
Algorithm 1 in the following Theorem 2.
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Theorem 2 (Utility of Algorithm 1). For any γ ∈ (0, 1),
Algorithm 1 ensures
β∗ − β∞ ≤ α with probability at least 1 − γ
for α := 2BNϵ · ln(d/γ ).
Proof. With R := β∗ − β , we know that R follows the probabil-
ity distribution [Lap( 2BNϵ )]d . Then denoting the d dimensions of R
by R[1],R[2], . . . ,R[d], we have
P
[β∗ − β∞ ≥ α
]
= P [‖R‖∞ ≥ α ]
= P
[(
max
k ∈{1,2, ...,d }
|R[k]|
)
≥α
]
≤
∑
k ∈{1,2, ...,d }
P [|R[k]|≥α ]
= d · P [|Lap( 2BNϵ )| ≥ α ] = γ for α := 2BNϵ · ln(d/γ ),
where the step of “≤” uses the union bound. 
Theorem 2 shows that the utility of Algorithm 1 decreases as d
increases. This is confirmed by Figure 5 on Page 9 for experimental
results.
From Theorem 1, both VLCP and RLCP assume a universal
privacy parameter for all voters; i.e., the same privacy protection
level for all voters. In the following subsection, we focus on
proposing algorithms with distributed perturbation so that voters
can choose personalized privacy parameters to achieve different
privacy protection levels.
4.3 VLDP/RLDP: Perturbing the Moral
Preference Parameter of Each Voter
This section introduces an algorithm to achieve VLDP and RLDP
by perturbing the moral preference parameter of each voter un-
der Laplace mechanism. Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo-code of
perturbing the preference parameter of each voter i with a per-
sonalized privacy parameter ϵi . Each voter i obtains its parameter
βi (Di ) according to Eq. (3), which enforces the ℓ1-norm of βi (Di )
to be at most B. Then, the sensitivity of each voter’s parameter βi
will 2B since the maximal changing range of βi is no greater than
2B with respect to neighboring datasets (see Theorem 3 for the
specific proofs). Then, the parameter of voter i will be perturbed
as β
∗
i (Di ) = βi (Di )+R, where R is a random Laplace noise vector
drawn from [Lap(2B/ϵi)]d .
After obtaining the noisy parameter of each voter i in a dis-
tributed way, the final social moral preference parameter can be
computed by averaging all voters’ parameters, that is β∗(D) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 β
∗
i (Di ) for D := {D1, · · · ,Di , · · · ,DN }. Note that we may
suppress the argument Di in βi (Di ), β
∗
i (Di ) and the argument D
in β∗(D) for simplicity.
Theorem 3 (Privacy of Algorithm 2). For each voter i , Algo-
rithm 2 satisfies ϵi -differential privacy for both VLDP and RLDP.
Proof. First, we prove that for voter i , the sensitivities ∆(i )
VLDP
and ∆(i )
RLDP
with respect to voter-neighboring datasets and record-
neighboring datasets are both 2B under distributed perturbation,
Algorithm 2: VLDP/RLDP: Perturbing the Preference Parameter of
Each Voter by Adding Laplace Noise
Input: voter i ’s dataset Di = { 〈X j, Zj 〉 |j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n }},
personalized privacy parameter ϵi , norm bound B
Output: noisy parameter β
∗
i of voter i
1 Apply MLE to estimate βi of voter i with log-likelihood function
L(βi ) =
∑n
j=1 lnΦ(β⊤i (X j − Zj )), subject to ‖β i ‖1 ≤ B;
2 Draw a random Laplace noise vector R ∼ [Lap(2B/ϵi )]d ;
3 return β
∗
i = β i + R ;
where
∆
(i)
VLDP
:= max
Di , D
′
i
‖β i (Di ) − β i (D′i )‖1, (6)
∆
(i)
RLDP
:= max
Di and D′i differing in one record
‖β i (Di ) − β i (D′i )‖1 . (7)
For voter i , let Di and D′i be two record-neighboring datasets.
Specifically, for Di := {〈X (i )1 ,Z
(i )
1 〉, 〈X
(i )
2 ,Z
(i )
2 〉, · · · , 〈X
(i )
n ,Z
(i )
n 〉 },
where each dimension of X (i )1 − Z
(i )
1 is 1, and each dimension
of X (i )j − Z
(i )
j for j ∈ {2, . . . ,n} is close to 0, we know from
Eq. (3) that each of the d dimensions of βi (Di ) is close to Bd .
For D′i := {〈X
(i )
1
′
,Z
(i )
1
′〉, 〈X (i )2 ,Z
(i )
2 〉, · · · , 〈X
(i )
n ,Z
(i )
n 〉 }, where each
dimension ofX (i )1 −Z
(i )
1 is −1, and each dimension ofX
(i )
j −Z
(i )
j for
j ∈ {2, . . . ,n} is close to 0, we know from Eq. (3) that each of the d
dimensions of βi (D′i ) is close to− Bd . Hence, the ℓ1-norm difference
between βi (Di ) and βi (D′i ) can be made to be arbitrarily close to
2B. Hence, for voter i , the ℓ1-norm sensitivity of βi with respect
to record-neighboring datasets is 2B.
In a way similar to the above argument, the ℓ1-norm sensitivity
of βi with respect to voter-neighboring datasets is 2B. Note that
voter i’s voter-neighboring datasets Di and D′i can differ arbitrar-
ily.
Therefore, we obtain ∆(i )
VLDP
= ∆
(i )
RLDP
= 2B. Since Algorithm 2
adds noises drawn from [Lap(2B/ϵi)]d to the parameter of each
voter i , thus it satisfies ϵi -differential privacy for both VLDP and
RLDP based on Laplace mechanism [11]. 
Theorem 4 (Utility of Algorithm 2). For any γ ∈ (0, 1),
Algorithm 2 ensures
β∗i − βi
∞ ≤ α with probability at least 1−γ
for α := 2Bϵi · ln(d/γ ).
Proof. With R := β
∗
i − βi , we know that R follows the proba-
bility distribution [Lap(2B/ϵi)]d . Then, by referring to the proof of
Theorem 2, we can easily obtain the conclusion of Theorem 4. We
omit the specific proof due to the space limitation. 
Our experiments in Section 5will show that achieving VLDP/RLDP
by adding Laplace noise to each voter’s parameter will lead to
a limited utility. Recall that VLDP (voter-level privacy protection
with distributed perturbation) itself is the strongest notion among
four paradigms focused in this paper. Thus, it accordingly has
the worst data utility. Clearly, we can know that the definition of
RLDP is relatively weaker than VLDP. However, RLDP holds the
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same low data utility as the VLDP when using Laplace mechanism.
Therefore, in the next section, we focus on proposing a novel
algorithm which can achieve RLDP while ensuring a higher data
utility.
4.4 RLDP: Perturbing the Object Function of
Each Voter
To further enhance the data utility, an alternative approach is
to perturb the objective function of each voter when conducting
MLE optimization. This is the functional mechanism of [31]. For
comparison, we will show in Section 5 (Figures 4 and 8(d)) that
the functional mechanism can provide better utility than adding
Laplace noise directly for record-level differential privacy.
In view of Eq. (2), we define V (i )j := X
(i )
j − Z
(i )
j . We split the
log-likelihood function for voter i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,N } as
L(βi ,V (i )j |j∈{1,2, ...,n }) =
∑n
j=1 lnΦ(β⊤i V
(i )
j ). (8)
Later, we will focus on one arbitrary voter i , and omit the notation
i in the analysis for simplicity. Since the final parameter β is just
the average of each βi , we can process each βi one by one.We then
split the objective function (8) for each record j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,n} as
f (Vj , β) = lnΦ(β⊤Vj ). (9)
Therefore, the optimal model parameter βo for each voter is:
βo = argmax
β
∑n
j=1 f (Vj , β). (10)
We denote a d-dimensional vector β by (β[1], · · · , β[d]). By
the Stone-Weierstrass Theorem [22], any continuous and differ-
entiable f (Vj , β) can always be written as a (potentially infinite)
polynomial of (β[1], · · · , β[d]). For someW ∈ [0,∞], we have
f (Vj , β) =
∑W
w=0
∑
ϕ ∈Ψw λϕ,Vjϕ(β), (11)
where λϕ
,Vj
∈ R is the coefficient of ϕ(β) in the polynomial. ϕ(β)
denotes the product of β[1], · · · , β[d] for some c1, · · · , cd ∈ N (the
set of non-negative integers). Ψw (w ∈ N) contains the set of all
products of β[1], · · · , β[d] with degreew , that is
Ψw =
{
(β[1])c1(β[2])c2 · · · (β[d])cd | ∑d
l=1 cl = w
}
.
Thus, we will express the objective function (9) for each user i
and each record j as a polynomial like Eq. (11). Let f1 and д1 be
two functions defined as follows:
д1(Vj , β) = β⊤Vj and f1(z) = lnΦ(z). (12)
Then we have f (Vj , β) = f1(д1(Vj , β)).
Using the Taylor expansion at 0, we write f (Vj , β) as f˜D (β)
below:
f˜D (β) =
∑n
j=1
∑∞
k=0
f
(k )
1 (0)
k ! (β⊤Vj )k . (13)
Then we adopt an approximation approach to reduce the degree
of the summation. In particular,we only use the value of f (k)1 (0) for
k = 0, 1, 2, where f (k)1 denotes the k-order derivative. Specifically,
we can compute f (0)1 (0) = ln 12 . From f
(1)
1 (z) =
Φ
′ (z)
Φ(z) , we get
Algorithm 3: RLDP: Perturbing the Object Function of Each Voter
Input: voter i ’s dataset Di = { 〈X j, Zj 〉 |j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n }} with
d-dimensional vector Vj := X j − Zj , objective function
fDi (βi ), personalized privacy parameter ϵi
Output: noisy parameter β∗i of voter i
1 Decompose cost function as f (Vj , βi ) = f1(д1(Vj , βi ));
2 Build an approximate objective function fˆDi (βi ), such that
fˆDi (βi ) =
∑n
j=1
∑2
k=0
f
(k )
1 (0)
k ! (д1(Vj , βi ))k ;
3 Set ∆upper = 2
√
2d/π + 2d/π ;
4 for each 0 ≤ w ≤ 2 do
5 for each ϕ ∈ Ψw do
6 Compute λϕ =
∑
Vj ∈Di λϕ,Vj + Lap(∆upper/ϵi );
7 Let f ∗
Di
(βi ) =
∑2
w=0
∑
ϕ∈Ψw λϕϕ (βi );
8 β∗i = argmax
βi
f ∗Di (βi );
9 Return β∗i ;
f
(1)
1 (0) =
√
2/π . From f (2)1 (z) =
Φ
′′ (z)·Φ(z)−Φ′ (z)·Φ′ (z)
Φ2(z) , we have
f
(2)
1 (0) = −2/π . Thus, we approximate f˜D (β) by
fˆD (β) :=
∑n
j=1
∑2
k=0
f
(k )
1 (0)
k ! (β⊤Vj )k . (14)
For each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,N }, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,n}, we preprocess the
data to make ‖X (i )j ‖2 ≤ 1/2 and ‖Z
(i )
j ‖2 ≤ 1/2. Then ‖V
(i )
j ‖2 ≤ 1
by triangle inequality. For simplicity, we suppress both i and j, and
write V ∈ D to mean V ∈ {V ′ : X ′ − Z ′ |〈X ′,Z ′〉 ∈ D}. Given
‖V ‖2 =
√∑d
k=1(V [k])2 ≤ 1, we have
∑d
k=1V [k] ≤
√
d by Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality, where V [k] denotes the k-th dimension of the
vectorV . Thus, from Lemma 1 in [31] and Eq. (14), we can compute
the ℓ1-sensitivity ∆ of the coefficient vector for β[1], · · · , β[d] in
Eq. (13) with respect to record-neighboring datasets as
∆ = 2 · max
V ∈D
∑W
w=1
∑
ϕ ∈Ψw
λϕ
,V

1
= 2 · max
V ∈D
(
f 11 (0)
1!
∑d
k=1V [k] +
f 21 (0)
2!
∑
1≤k,l ≤d V [k]V [l]
)
≤ 2
(√
2d/π + d/π
)
,
which we denote by ∆upper below.
After computing the sensitivity’s upper bound ∆upper as above,
we inject Laplace noise with scale ∆upper/ϵi to the coefficients of
the objective function and then solve the noisy objective function
to estimate the moral parameters β∗i of each voter i . Algorithm 3
shows the pseudo-code of our algorithm. From the above analysis,
we have a theorem below.
Theorem 5 (Privacy of Algorithm 3). Algorithm 3 satisfies ϵi -
differential privacy for RLDP.
Proof. Theorem 5 on privacy follows the above analysis. 
We now discuss the utility of Algorithm 3 and show that
Algorithm3 ensures that f˜Di (β∗i )− f˜Di (β truei ) is bounded by a small
quantity, for β truei := argmax
βi
f˜Di (βi ).
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We also define βˆi := argmax
βi
fˆDi (βi ). Then we obtain f˜Di (βˆi ) −
f˜Di (β truei ) = [ f˜Di (βˆi ) − fˆDi (βˆi )] − [ f˜Di (β truei ) − fˆDi (β truei )] +
[ fˆDi (βˆi )− fˆDi (β truei )] ≤ maxβi [ f˜Di (βi )− fˆDi (βi )]−minβi [ f˜Di (βi )−
fˆDi (βi )]. From Taylor’s theorem with the Lagrange remainder,
there exists γ such that 1n f˜Di (βi ) − 1n fˆDi (βi ) =
f
(3)
1 (γ )
6 γ
3. As in
Lemma 3 of [31], we consider γ ∈ [−1, 1]. In our case of MLE, for
the function f1(z) = lnΦ(z), we have
f
(3)
1 (z) =
Φ
′′′(z) · Φ(z) + [Φ′′(z)]2 − 2 · Φ′′(z) · Φ′(z)
Φ2(z)
+
2[Φ′(z)]3 − 2Φ′′(z) · Φ′(z) · Φ(z)
Φ3(z) . (15)
It can be verified that minz f
(3)
1 (z) = −0.2097 and maxz f
(3)
1 (z) =
0.4882. Thus, the error of approximation on MLE is a small con-
stant; i.e., f˜Di (βˆi ) − f˜Di (β truei ) ≤ [0.4882 − (−0.2097)]/6 = 0.1163.
Besides, it also can be concluded from Theorem 2 of [31] that
βˆi := argmax
βi
fˆDi (βi ) converges to β∗i := argmax
βi
f ∗
Di
(βi ) when
n → +∞. Thus, Algorithm 3 ensures that f˜Di (β∗i ) − f˜Di (β truei ) is
bounded.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section implements our proposed algorithms and evaluates
their performance on synthetic datasets and a real-world dataset
extracted from the Moral Machine, respectively. We run each
experiment 100 times and report the average results.
5.1 Synthetic Data
We first present the experimental results on synthetic data. De-
note the true parameter of each voter i as βi which is sampled
from Gaussian distribution N(m, Id ), where each mean m j for
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,d} is independently sampled from the uniform
distribution U(−1, 1), and Id is the d × d identity matrix with d
being the dimension size (i.e., the number of features). By default,
we set d = 10 when not specified. For each voter i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N },
we generate its n pairwise comparison via the following two steps
(by default n = 50 when not specified). First, we sample two
alternatives x1 and x2 independently from the Gaussian distri-
bution N(0, Id ). Second, we sample their utilities Ux1 and Ux2
based on the Gaussian distribution N(β⊤i x1, 12 ) and N(β⊤i x2, 12 ),
respectively. To evaluate the performance of our algorithms, we
compute the accuracy which is defined as the fraction of test
instances on which the true and noisy parameters give the same
exact outcome. Besides, the parameter B is set as B = 2 in the
following experiments.
The results in Figures 1, 2 and 3 show high accuracies of our
Algorithms 1, Algorithms 2 and 3 on the synthetic dataset with the
privacy parameter ϵ varying from 0.01 to 10; specifically, we con-
sider ϵ ∈ {0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.05, 0.07, 0.09, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9,
1, 2, 3, 5, 10}. Note that we here use the same privacy parameter ϵ
for all voters and will analyse the personalized privacy parameter
specifically in the following. As shown in all figures, a smaller ϵ
(i.e., higher privacy protection level) will lead to a lower accuracy.
Moreover, Figures 1, 2 and 3 (all withd = 10) show that for three
Algorithms 1, 2 and 3, a larger number of voters (i.e., N ) or a larger
number of records (i.e., n) leads to better accuracy. This is because
our output is the average of each voter. Then with more voters,
each one is relatively less sensitive. Therefore, it can achieve better
accuracy (less noise) while keeping the same privacy.
We also compare the accuracies of three Algorithms 1, 2 and
3. As shown in Figure 4, Algorithms 1 outperforms the other
two algorithms. Also, both Algorithms 1 and 3 have much better
accuracy than Algorithm 2. This is because Algorithm 2 realizes
distributed privacy protection by adding Laplace noise, which
ensures strong privacy guarantees, thus leading a relatively low
data utility. In contrast, Algorithm 3 also achieves distributed
privacy protection by perturbing the objective function instead of
parameters directly, which improves the data utility greatly. There-
fore, Figure 4 illustrates the superiority of functional mechanism
over Laplace for record-level privacy protection with distributed
perturbation.
Impact of the dimension d . Figure 5 shows the comparisons
of the impact of parameter d on the accuracy of the Algorithms 1
and 3. Due to the space limitation, we no longer present the result
of Algorithm 2 here since it has limited data utility as shown in
Figure 4. It can be seen from Figure 5 that the accuracy of both
Algorithms 1 and 3 will be decreased with the increase of dimen-
sion d . For Algorithm 1, the larger d means more information to
be protected so the accuracy will be reduced. For Algorithm 3, the
sensitivity will increase with the increase of d , thus leading to the
reduction of the accuracy when d becomes larger.
Impact of the personalizedprivacy parameters.We also im-
plement personalized privacy parameter choices for RLDP (i.e., Al-
gorithm 3) and conduct extensive experiments to show the impact
of the personalized privacy parameter on accuracies. Although
Algorithm 2 can also achieve personalized privacy protection, we
no longer present the result of Algorithm 2 here since it has limited
data utility and due to the space limitation.
We set personalized privacy parameter specifications based on
the findings from studies in [2, 19]. The voters are randomly
divided into three groups: (i) conservative, (ii)moderate, and (iii) lib-
eral, representing voters with high/medium/low privacy concern,
respectively. The fraction of voters in three groups are fC , fM , and
fL , where fC + fM + fL = 1. We set default values as fC = 0.54,
fM = 0.36, and fL = 0.1, which are chosen based on the findings
reported in [2]. The privacy parameters ϵ of voters who belong to
conservative or moderate groups are chosen uniformly at random
from [ϵC ,ϵM ] or [ϵM ,ϵL] correspondingly (and rounding to the
nearest hundredth), where ϵC ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, · · · , 0.5},
ϵM ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, · · · , 0.5}, and ϵL = 1, and the default
values are underlined.
Then, we implement Algorithm 3 by setting personalized pri-
vacy parameters as specified above. Figure 6(a) shows the accuracy
of Algorithm 3 by varying the fraction of conservative voters fC
from 0.1 to 0.6 by setting n = 50 and d = 10. Note that for each set
of fC , the fraction of moderate voter is fixed as fM = 0.36 and the
fraction of liberal voters is equal to 1− (fC + fM ). We can observe
from Figure 6(a) the accuracy will be reduced when increasing
fC . This is because increasing fC will increase the number of
conservative voters (prefer for choosing small ϵ) but decrease the
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Figure 1: Accuracy of Algorithm 1 (VLCP/RLCP under Laplace
mechanism) vs. privacy parameter ϵ on synthetic dataset.
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Figure 2: Accuracy of Algorithm 2 (VLDP/RLDP under Laplace
mechanism) vs. privacy parameter ϵ on synthetic dataset.
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Figure 3: Accuracy of Algorithm 3 (RLDP under functional mecha-
nism) vs. privacy parameter ϵ on synthetic dataset.
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Figure 4: Comparisons of Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 on synthetic
dataset.
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Figure 5: Accuracies of Algorithm 1 andAlgorithm3 vs. dimension
d on synthetic dataset.
number of liberal voters (prefer for choosing large ϵ), thus leading
to more noise injections and accuracy reductions.
Furthermore, Figures 6(b) and 6(c) present experimental results
on the impact on accuracy when varying the range of ϵC or ϵM ,
respectively. Figure 6(b) shows the accuracy of Algorithm 3 when
varying ϵC from 0.01 to 0.5 by fixing moderate privacy parameter
as ϵM = 0.5 (rather than the default value of ϵM = 0.2 to ensure
ϵC ≤ ϵM in all cases). It can be seen that the larger ϵC or N will
induce better accuracy. Besides, Figure 6(c) shows the accuracy
of Algorithm 3 when changing ϵM from 0.05 to 0.5 by fixing
ϵC = 0.01. We can observe again that larger ϵM or N will lead to
better accuracy. What’s more, the accuracy of Figure 6(b) is higher
than that of Figure 6(c). This is because the conservative privacy
parameter in Figure 6(c) always equals to 0.01 and the fraction of
conservative voters is bigger than that of moderate voters.
Impact of the norm bound B. In addition, we also analyze the
impact of norm bound B on the accuracies of Algorithms 1 and 2,
as shown in Figure 7. It can be observed that the accuracy will be
relatively higher when norm bound around at 2 or 3.
5.2 Moral Machine Data
The Moral Machine data contain the moral decisions by voters
about ethical dilemmas faced by autonomous vehicles. Each voter
is asked to view 13 scenarios (i.e. n = 13), each of which in-
cludes two possible moral dilemma alternatives. Each alternative
is characterized by 23 features (i.e. d = 23). We sample 200 voters’
data (N = 200) from the Moral Machine dataset to evaluate our
algorithms.
Figures 8(a), 8(b) and 8(c) plot the accuracies of our Algo-
rithms 1,2 and 3 on the real dataset for privacy parameters ϵ from
0.01 to 10 and for different numbers of voters (i.e., N ), respectively.
The privacy parameter specifications follow the same settings of
the synthetic dataset in Section 5.1. As expected, larger N or larger
ϵ will induce better accuracy for all three Algorithms 1,2 and 3.
In addition, Figure 8(d) shows the comparisons of three Al-
gorithms 1,2 and 3 with N = 100,n = 13. It can observe
from Figure 8(d) that Algorithm 1 relatively outperforms Algo-
rithms 2 and 3 and the Algorithm 2 has the lowest accuracy in
all cases. This is because Algorithm 2 follows a strong privacy defi-
nition with distributed Laplace perturbation, which leads to larger
noise addition. In contrast, Algorithm 3 also achieves distributed
privacy protect while ensuring a good data utility since it perturbs
objective functions instead of parameters. Thus, this demonstrates
the superiority of functional mechanism over Laplace mechanism
for record-level privacy protection with distributed perturbation.
Furthermore, extensive experiments for personalized parameter
settings are also conducted on the Moral Machine data, which
follows the same privacy parameter specifications as Section 5.1.
Figure 9 shows the accuracies of the Algorithm 3 under different
personalized privacy parameters. Two figures in Figure 9 present
the impact of the conservative privacy parameters ϵC (resp., mod-
erate privacy parameters ϵM ) on accuracies by varying ϵC from
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Figure 6: Accuracies of Algorithm 3 vs. personalized privacy parameter settings with ϵL = 1.
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Figure 8: Accuracies of Algorithms 1, 2 and 3 versus privacy parameter ϵ on real dataset from the Moral Machine.
0.01 to 0.5 with ϵM = 0.5 (reps., ϵM from 0.05 to 0.5 with ϵC = 0.01).
Both figures show that larger ϵC or ϵM will lead to higher accuracy.
5.3 Comparisons with No Privacy
To further show the effectiveness of our privacy-preserving algo-
rithms, we present the ratio of the accuracy of our algorithms
to the baseline method that with no privacy protection (i.e., so-
lution of Noothigattu et al. [21]). As shown in Figure 10, Algo-
rithms 1 and 3 hold better accuracy than Algorithm 2 on both
synthetic dataset (with N = 50 and n = 100, Noothigattu et
al.’s method has 92.4% accuracy) and real dataset (with N = 200
and n = 13, Noothigattu et al.’s method has 98.2% accuracy). In
particular, we can observe that Algorithms 1 and 3 can ensure
greater than 80% accuracy when ϵ > 0.3 and greater than 90%
accuracy when ϵ > 1.
6 DISCUSSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Choice of ϵ . Our algorithms adopt the formal notion of ϵ-DP
in which smaller ϵ means stronger privacy protection but less
utility. In the literature, typical ϵ values chosen for experimental
studies are mostly between 0.1 and 10 [1, 19, 28]. In the industry,
both Google Chrome and Apple iOS have implemented ϵ-DP (in
particular, a specific variant called ϵ-local differential privacy [8]).
In Google Chrome [13], ϵ per each datum is at most 2, and ϵ per
each user is at most 9. Apple claims that ϵ per each datum per day
in iOS is between 1 and 2, but a recent study [25] shows that it can
be as high as 16.
Future Work on Privacy Protection for Crowdsourced
Data Collection for Fairness Studies of Machine Learning.
Fairness of machine learning algorithms has received much inter-
est recently [24]. Among various fairness notions, demographic
parity means equalizing the percentage of people who are pre-
dicted by the algorithm to be positive across different social groups
(e.g., racial groups) [9]. Srivastava et al. [24] have collected a large
crowdsourced dataset to capture people’s perception of fairness of
machine learning. As a user’s perception of fairness may contain
sensitive information, a future direction in the same vein as our
current paper is to preserve the privacy of users in the aggregation
of fairness preferences.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper incorporates privacy protection into crowdsourced data
collection used to guide ethical decision-making by AI. Based on
the formal notion differential privacy, we proposed four different
privacy protection paradigms with the consideration of voter-
/record-level privacy protection and centralized/distributed per-
turbation. Then, we specifically propose three algorithms which
achieve the above four granularities of privacy protectionparadigms.
We have proved the privacy guarantees and the data utilities of our
algorithms. To show the effectiveness of our algorithms, extensive
experiments have been conducted on both synthetic datasets and
a real-world dataset from the Moral Machine project.
REFERENCES
[1] Martin Abadi, Andy Chu, Ian Goodfellow, H Brendan McMahan, Ilya Mironov,
Kunal Talwar, and Li Zhang. 2016. Deep learning with differential privacy. In
Proc. ACM SIGSAC CCS. 308–318.
[2] Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags. 2005. Privacy and rationality in
individual decision making. IEEE Security & Privacy 3, 1 (2005), 26–33.
[3] Edmond Awad, Sohan Dsouza, Richard Kim, Jonathan Schulz, Joseph Henrich,
Azim Shariff, Jean-François Bonnefon, and Iyad Rahwan. 2018. The moral
machine experiment. Nature 563, 7729 (2018), 59.
[4] Jean-François Bonnefon, Azim Shariff, and Iyad Rahwan. 2016. The social
dilemma of autonomous vehicles. Science 352, 6293 (2016), 1573–1576.
[5] Kyle Brubaker. 2018. Artificial Intelligence: Issues of Consumer Privacy, Industry
Risks, and Ethical Concerns. Ph.D. Dissertation. Utica College.
[6] Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Miguel E Andrés, Nicolás Emilio Bordenabe, and
Catuscia Palamidessi. 2013. Broadening the scope of differential privacy using
metrics. In Proc. PETS. 82–102.
[7] Vincent Conitzer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jana Schaich Borg, Yuan Deng,
and Max Kramer. 2017. Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial
Intelligence. In Proc. AAAI. 4831–4835.
10
0.01 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Conservative privacy parameter setting
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Ac
cu
ra
cy
N=50
N=200
0.05 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Moderate privacy parameter setting
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
Ac
cu
ra
cy
N=50
N=200
(a) Impact of ϵC (ϵM = 0.5) (b) Impact of ϵM (ϵC = 0.01)
Figure 9:Accuracies of Algorithm3 vs. personalized privacy param-
eters with ϵL = 1 on real dataset from the Moral Machine.
0.01 0.03 0.1 0.3 1 3 10
Privacy parameter 
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f t
he
 a
cc
ur
ac
y 
wi
th
pr
iva
cy
 to
 th
at
 w
ith
 n
o 
pr
iva
cy
Algorithm 1
Algorithm 2
Algorithm 3
0.01 0.03 0.1 0.3 1 3 10
Privacy parameter 
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f t
he
 a
cc
ur
ac
y 
wi
th
pr
iva
cy
 to
 th
at
 w
ith
 n
o 
pr
iva
cy
Algorithm 1
Algorithm 2
Algorithm 3
(a) Synthetic dataset (b) Real dataset
Figure 10: Comparisons on the accuracies between our privacy-
preserving algorithms with that with no privacy.
[8] John C Duchi, Michael I Jordan, and Martin J Wainwright. 2013. Local privacy
and statistical minimax rates. In Proc. IEEE FOCS. 429–438.
[9] Cynthia Dwork, Moritz Hardt, Toniann Pitassi, Omer Reingold, and Richard
Zemel. 2012. Fairness through awareness. In Proc. ITCS. 214–226.
[10] Cynthia Dwork, Krishnaram Kenthapadi, Frank McSherry, Ilya Mironov, and
Moni Naor. 2006. Our data, ourselves: Privacy via distributed noise generation.
In Proc. Eurocrypt. 486–503.
[11] Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, Kobbi Nissim, and Adam Smith. 2006. Cali-
brating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis. In Proc. TCC. 265–284.
[12] Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth. 2014. The algorithmic foundations of differ-
ential privacy. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science 9, 3–4
(2014), 211–407.
[13] Úlfar Erlingsson, Vasyl Pihur, and Aleksandra Korolova. 2014. RAPPOR: Ran-
domized aggregatable privacy-preserving ordinal response. In Proc. ACM CCS.
1054–1067.
[14] Matt Fredrikson, Somesh Jha, and Thomas Ristenpart. 2015. Model inversion
attacks that exploit confidence information and basic countermeasures. In Proc.
ACM SIGSAC CCS. 1322–1333.
[15] Joshua Greene, Francesca Rossi, John Tasioulas, Kristen Brent Venable, and
Brian Charles Williams. 2016. Embedding Ethical Principles in Collective
Decision Support Systems.. In Proc. AAAI, Vol. 16. 4147–4151.
[16] Joshua D Greene. 2016. Our driverless dilemma. Science 352, 6293 (2016), 1514–
1515.
[17] Lewis Hammond and Vaishak Belle. 2018. Deep Tractable Probabilistic Models
for Moral Responsibility. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.03736 (2018).
[18] Meg Leta Jones, Ellen Kaufman, and Elizabeth Edenberg. 2018. AI and the Ethics
of Automating Consent. IEEE Security & Privacy 16, 3 (2018), 64–72.
[19] Zach Jorgensen, Ting Yu, and Graham Cormode. 2015. Conservative or liberal?
Personalized differential privacy. In Proc. IEEE ICDE. 1023–1034.
[20] Frederick Mosteller. 2006. Remarks on the method of paired comparisons: I. The
least squares solution assuming equal standard deviations and equal correlations.
In Selected Papers of Frederick Mosteller. Springer, 157–162.
[21] Ritesh Noothigattu, Snehalkumar S Gaikwad, Edmond Awad, Sohan Dsouza,
Iyad Rahwan, Pradeep Ravikumar, and Ariel D Procaccia. 2018. A voting-based
system for ethical decision making. In Proc. AAAI. 1587–1594.
[22] Walter Rudin. 1964. Principles of mathematical analysis. Vol. 3. McGraw-hill
New York.
[23] Azim Shariff, Jean-Francois Bonnefon, and Iyad Rahwan. 2017. Psychological
roadblocks to the adoption of self-driving vehicles. Nature Human Behaviour 1,
10 (2017), 694.
[24] Megha Srivastava, Hoda Heidari, and Andreas Krause. 2019. Mathematical
Notions vs. Human Perception of Fairness: A Descriptive Approach to Fairness
for Machine Learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.04783 (2019).
[25] Jun Tang, Aleksandra Korolova, Xiaolong Bai, Xueqiang Wang, and Xiaofeng
Wang. 2017. Privacy loss in Apple’s implementation of differential privacy on
MacOS 10.12. arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.02753 (2017).
[26] Florian Tramèr, Zhicong Huang, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, and Erman Ayday. 2015.
Differential privacy with bounded priors: Reconciling utility and privacy in
genome-wide association studies. In Proc. ACM CCS. 1286–1297.
[27] Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen. 2008. Moral machines: Teaching robots right
from wrong. Oxford University Press.
[28] Ning Wang, Xiaokui Xiao, Yin Yang, Jun Zhao, Siu Cheung Hui, Hyejin Shin,
Junbum Shin, and Ge Yu. 2019. Collecting and AnalyzingMultidimensional Data
with Local Differential Privacy. In Proc. IEEE ICDE.
[29] Han Yu, Zhiqi Shen, Chunyan Miao, Cyril Leung, Victor R Lesser, and Qiang
Yang. 2018. Building ethics into artificial intelligence. In Proc. IJCAI.
[30] Hanrui Zhang and Vincent Conitzer. 2019. A PAC Framework for Aggregating
AgentsâĂŹ Judgments. In Proc. AAAI.
[31] Jun Zhang, Zhenjie Zhang, Xiaokui Xiao, Yin Yang, andMarianneWinslett. 2012.
Functional mechanism: Regression analysis under differential privacy. Proc.
VLDB Endowment 5, 11 (2012), 1364–1375.
11
